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Light Beers are Brewing

- - - - - - - - - - - - -- - - -- - - - - -- -

Scott Dean and Joseph Hanson

Probably no better example of product warfare exists than that of "Light
Beer." Our objective is to present a clear picture of this product war. In
order to understand light beer wars one must understand the history of this
product, the positioning of light beers, and the tactics and strategies that
have been used to the manufacturers' benefit.
THE ONSET OF MILLER LITE

In 1967 Meister Brau, a Chicago brewer, launched a low-calorie beer under
the name of Lite. It was distributed nationally but sold poorly. Though
Meister Brau had extensively studied the market before determining the
need for a light beer product, it did not back the product with sufficient
advertising resources for it to catch on. In early 1972, Miller Brewing Company, then owned by Philip Morris, acquired Meister Brau and created a
whole new image for the "Lite" product. Miller was impressed with Meister
Brau's marketing research which showed more consumer interest in a low
calorie beer than sales had reflected. It took Miller only three years to
develop Lite and launch it into the marketplace.
By 1975, Miller Lite was nationally distributed and a runaway success
( Time, 1978, p. 74; Flanagan, 1978, p. 76). The major attribute Miller centered on was calories. Miller wanted to establish the product in the
consumer's mind as being just like regular beer, but with fewer calories.
Miller's slogan, "Everything you always wanted in a beer and less, " did just
that. Philip Morris used a similar strategy with its low tar cigarettes. Both
products are aimed at giving customers some psychological relief whenever
they indulge in something they feel is bad for them, creating the fe e ling of
making small sins out of large ones. In addition, Miller Lite sold for 25
cents more per six pack than oth er beers, giving it the aura of being of
gre ate r value (Flanagan, 1978, p. 75) . Mill e r also launched the product with
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an expensive advertising campaign featuring Mickey Spillane and ex-football player Bubba Smith to give a macho image to Lite. Through this
three-part marketing strategy Miller Lite succeeded in being first in the
consumer's mind.
LIGHT BEER BATTLES BREW

In actuality, Beer War tactics have not changed dramatically since the era of
Al Capone. In the early decades of the twentieth century, when a new
saloon opened, the company that put in the beer pipes, or the lighting, or
paid a cash bribe to the proprietor was the one whose beer was sold over the
bar. Today, the company that gives the best price, the one which backs the
product with advertising, or the one that sponsors events, gets the business.
In each of these marketing strategies, consumer demand plays a central
part (Flanagan, 1978, p. 74).
By July of 1978, Miller's success had already spawned 18 imitations. As of
1991, light beer comprised 30% of the total beer market. Though many
believed light beers were targeted at women who do, in fact, drink more
light than regular beer, young men between the ages of 25 and 34 make up
the largest consumption group (Bittman, 1991, p. 206).
SCHLITZ AND BUSCH STALK CLOSE BEHIND

Following Miller Lite's success, Schlitz attempted to get in on the new light
product market with the creation of "Schlitz Light." A line extension product, Schlitz Light soon fell by the wayside because it was viewed as a "me
too" product or an "imitation" of Miller Lite. It was also confused with regular Schlitz.
Anheuser Busch's entry was "Natural Light." The name was descriptive;
indeed, it may have been too generic. Consumers did not feel the name
described the product. Anheuser-Busch's launch was an offensive attack
based on a lower pricing structure; however, lower pricing was only part of
the strategy. Anheuser-Busch set out to reposition Miller Lite-an ingenious offensive move. Attempting to use the Lite name against Miller,
Anheuser-Busch adopted the slogan "Ask for a Natural, don't get misconscrewed" (Norm Crosby, Ries and Trout, 1991, p. 146). This approach
derived from Anheuser-Busch's belief that many consumers viewed ordering a Natural as less hassle than ordering a Lite and then having to indicate
a Miller Lite. This strategy has had some effect, for Natural still holds a
good position in the light beer market.
Michelob, Anheuser-Busch's premium product, attempted a guerilla
attack in the light beer category in 1978. Its tactic was to brew a premium
light beer. Michelob hoped to gain the upper end of the light beer niche,
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and initially it won its battle. By 1985, Michelob controlled a respectable 7%
of the light beer market (Prince, 1992, p. 82). Not content with this success ,
however, Michelob tried to go after more market share by expanding its battlefield. Instead of maintaining and defending its premium lite niche, it
moved out and attempted to compete against the other non-premium light
contenders. As a result, Mic he lob Light fell out of its niche and lost market
share. By 1991 its market share had fallen to 3.9% of the light beer market.
This retreat was also clue, in part, to the fact that Michelob introduced
another line extension, Michelob Golden Draft Light (Charlier, 1990;
Flanagan, 1978) . As with most line extensions, the new product took sales
away •from the original product.
COORS NOT PREPARED FOR LIGHT WAR

Coors was actually one of the first companies on the light beer battlefield in
the early 1970s; its regular Coors product was lighter than other beers. In
fact, Coors' slogan was "America's Fine Light Beer." However, at that time
Coors distributed its beer only within a small region of the U .S., and it
failed to emphasize the beer's fewer calories. In short, Coors was not ready
for battle. In 1978, Trout and Ries Inc. urged Coors to use the fewer calorie
angle to its advantage. However, Coors never attempted to fight the light
battle with its regular product. Here, Coors was a pioneer, only it failed to
emphasize the very factor which differentiated its product from the others:
its fewer calories.
Coors used a far different approach to position its Coors Light in 1978.
Some 23 light beers were in existence at the time, and Coors hoped to capitalize on its "Rocky Mountain" image and its use of pure Rocky Mountain
spring water which had been successful in selling regular Coors. Coors was
indeed popular for its mountain mystique; however, its marketing plan was
less inspired. Coors believed its light product would be as popular as regular Coors and just "walk off the shelves." Coors Light did become popular,
especially in California. However, this success was gained at the expense of
regular Coors. In truth, since Coors already had a low calorie beer in its
regular product, Coors Light was redundant.
THE MARKET GETS SHOOK UP

In 1985, Miller Lite held 54% of the light beer market. Coors Light maintained a 17% share, while Anheuser-Busch's Michelob Light hooked 7%, its
Natural Light possessed 5%, and its Bud Light, 1.6%. The remaining 15%
was shared by various small brewers (Prince, 1992, p. 82). In the 1990s, the
number of light beers has increased dramatically. Among the big three, the
market share formerly divided among five brands is now divided among 11
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beers. As of 1991, Miller Lite held a 34.7% market share, and is still the
largest seller. The rest of the market is shared by Coors Light with 21.4%;
Buel Light, the lite beer making the greatest gains, with 21.3%; Natural
Light, which is up slightly, at 7.8%; Michelob Light, which fell to 1.7%; and
the new entrants since 1985 (Prince, 1992, p. 82). If one looks only at barrels shipped, Miller has remained virtually the same. However, Buel Light is
coming on strong, with Natural Light not to be discounted. During recessionary times Natural Light has an advantage because of its lower price .
BUD FLANKS WITH SPOKES-DOG AND BUD BOWL

In the late 1980s, Bud Light successfully flanked the "younger" niche originally
held by Miller Lite through the appeal of it spokes-dog, Spuds Mackenze.
Spuds was highly popular among young drinkers, which allowed Bud Light to
take the younger niche (Charlier, 1990, p. Cl2). Another Bud Light flanking
move was to increase its marketing in the sports arena. Bud Light has always
capitalized on tie-ins with sports and sporting events. It is now working to gain a
bigger share of the Super Bowl crowd by staging its own "Buel Bowl." Bud Light
is also flanking the market by leaving traditional T.V. advertising, which is highly competitive, and moving its efforts to advertising during sporting events such
as the Super Bowl (Lipman, 1990, p. B 1).
However, it seems just when a company is doing something right in the
warfare game, it becomes greedy and does something wrong. In April 1991,
Anheuser-Busch introduced Bud Dry on a national level. In attempting to
head off Miller's brand extension, Anheuser-Busch confused the consumer
with one of its own. Instead of marketing warfare, we have brand extension
warfare and all the players are sure to lose. The airwaves are now saturated
with ex-sports stars promoting beer.
COORS USES "SILVER BULLETS"

In the early 1990s, Coors launched a mildly successful offensive campaign
for its Coors line with its slogan "The Si Iver Bullet Won't Slow You Down."
This was backed by silver cans and in-store promotions. Coors also pulled
off a guerilla attack against Anheuser-Busch's Natural Light by introducing
Keystone Light. This new low priced product, not associated with Coors, is
taking off. Indeed, Coors is working to position its Keystone Light product
in the blue collar worker niche (Teinowitz, 1991, p. 21). Perhaps Coors is
now taking the Ries and Trout advice it ignored during the introduction of
light beers and is stressing Keystone's low calories as well as low price.
MILLER RETREATS AND REGROUPS

Looking back at Miller Lite's success, we believe Miller was simply lucky to have
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been the first in the consumer's mind. However, in 1992 Miller Lite made a
classic positioning error. It began moving away from the clear identity it had
established in its earlier promotions (Teinowitz, 1991, p. 1). Miller began using
the slogan "It's It," a phrase lacking a clear message. The slogan was trying to
convey that Miller Lite was the best beer, rather than the first light beer, which
only confused consumers (Lipman, 1992, p . B5).
Since this advertising fiasco, Miller has shown more wisdom in pursuing
a truly defensive strategy. Not to be outdone by the rising Bud Light, Miller
Lite began testing a new beer, Lite Ultra. This beer was to have only 77 calories as compared to 96 in a bottle of Miller Lite . Miller will try to position
this beer as the "new generation of light beers." It hopes Lite Ultra will be
the coming trend in beers, appealing to a younger, fast paced crowd.
Through this initiative, Miller is attacking Bud Light and Coors Light,
along with itself. This clever defensive move will allow Miller to steer away
from the confusion created with it earlier Lite extensions. However, the
ultimate question is whether the lighter light beer (and its alcoholic content) will satisfy expectations sufficiently to attract the old light beer crowd
(New York Tirnes, 1991, p. 59).
Miller's Lite Ultra raises another warfare question as well. Al Ries, consultancy chairman of Trout and Ries Inc., has said that:
Nobody has ever turned around a declining brand, except by lowering the price . I shoi.ild think they should harvest the brand [Miller
Lite] and put as little as possible into it .... People think of Miller
now as Genuine Draft not as Lite. (Teinowitz, 1991, p. 54)

FUTURE BATTLES ARE POSSIBLE
The future of the light beer wars is uncertain. With the exception of Coors
Light, not one company has a clear marketing war strategy. Miller Lite has
been stagnant for some time and has not increased its market share proportionally with the increase of the market. Miller may have a chance with Lite
Ultra, however. Bud Light, on the other hand, has the new problem of Bud
Dry. It is doubtful that the market will be able to distinguish between the
two. Bud is still working offensively against Miller Lite in an attempt to outpromote Miller. Both brands have exhausted the advertising market in their
use of ex- sports heroes. They will have to find new angles. Coors appears to
be the one company holding down the fort. It is working to stay in the battle without introducing a new Coors product. However, in an attempt to
keep up with the others, Coors may make the same mistakes.
In the flanking and guerilla war, Micheloh Light should be able to hold
its own in the high end niche-if it is wise. In the low end niche, the light
beer out-performing all the others is Anheuser-Busch's Natural Light. By
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attacking Miller Lite's name and employing a low price strategy, Natural
Light has overcome its own name problem, carved a clear niche in th e market and is gaining in market share. Another favorite in the low end is
Keystone Light. Coors has done an excellent job of moving Keystone Light
into the market and flanking its way into the low end niche.
CONCLUSION

The principles of marketing warfare are evident in the light beer war. One
sees the "principle of force" in the expensive advertising campaigns being
waged, and the superiority of defense in Miller's use of a variety of tacticssome more successful than others-to remain at the top of the light beer
market. Furthermore, guerilla warfare is being waged in the premium light
beer category, while an offensive move is occurring in the low price niche.
With such a scenario in place, the light beer war seems likely to continue
for years to come.
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